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Abstract-We consider the problem of private information retrieval (PIR) with colluding servers and eavesdroppers (abbreviated as ETPIR). The ETPIR problem is comprised of K messages, N servers where each server stores all K messages, a user who wants to retrieve one of the K messages without revealing the desired message index to any set of T colluding servers, and an eavesdropper who can listen to the queries and answers of any E servers but is prevented from learning any information about the messages. The information theoretic capacity of ETPIR is defined to be the maximum number of desired message symbols retrieved privately per information symbol downloaded. We show that the capacity of ETPIR is C = (1 − ) when E ≥ T . To achieve the capacity, the servers need to share a common random variable (independent of the messages), and its size must be at least E N · 1 C symbols per message symbol. Otherwise, with less amount of shared common randomness, ETPIR is not feasible and the capacity reduces to zero. An interesting observation is that the ETPIR capacity expression takes different forms in two regimes. When E < T, the capacity equals the inverse of a sum of a geometric series with K terms and decreases with K; this form is typical for capacity expressions of PIR. When E ≥ T , the capacity does not depend on K, a typical form for capacity expressions of SPIR (symmetric PIR, which further requires data-privacy, i.e., the user learns no information about other undesired messages); the capacity does not depend on T either. In addition, the ETPIR capacity result includes multiple previous PIR and SPIR capacity results as special cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of private information retrieval (PIR) is to retrieve one message out of K messages privately from N servers (each stores all K messages) without letting any server know the identity of the requested message. An important factor in the design of such PIR protocols is the communication efficiency. Recently, a series of works studies diverse variations of the PIR problem from an information-theoretic perspective. Among these works, the messages are considered to be long sequences, such that the upload cost is neglected as it is diminishing when compared to the download cost. The communication efficiency is measured by the capacity, which is defined as the maximum number of desired information bits retrieved privately per information bit downloaded.
The first work in this series is [1] , which finds the PIR capacity as icant number of following works add various elements to the PIR problem to form different variations. Among these elements, three are most relevant to this work: colluding servers, adversaries, and symmetric PIR (SPIR).
We first discuss related works on colluding servers. In the modeling of the initial work [1] , the servers do not share information about their communication with the user, i.e., they do not collude to infer the identity of the requested message. However, it is possible in practical systems that some sets of servers can communicate and then potentially collude. In [2] , the problem where any set of T servers may collude is studied (TPIR) and the capacity is established to
. Beyond TPIR, PIR with arbitrary collusion patterns (where the cardinality of each set of colluding servers may vary) is first studied in [3] and the capacity of one particular case is found in [4] , where the colluding sets are disjoint.
The second element is adversaries, referring to scenarios where the communication system is vulnerable to passive and/or active attacks. This is also a practical factor to consider in PIR protocol design, because applications of cloud storage are usually built on open systems and networks, where preserving data security and privacy is crucial and more challenging. The problem of TPIR with an active adversary who may erase the responses from any A servers is considered in [2] and interestingly, the capacity in this setting equals the capacity of TPIR with N − A servers (the number of surviving servers). The problem of TPIR with a Byzantine (active) adversary who may introduce arbitrary errors to the responses from any B servers is considered in [5] and interestingly, the capacity in this setting equals the capacity of TPIR with N − 2B servers times (N − 2B)/N (where 2B out of all N servers are used to identify and correct the errors and are thus wasted, akin to the Hamming distance requirement in algebraic coding theory). In this work, we consider the problem of TPIR with a passive eavesdropper who may hear the responses from any E servers while learning nothing about the messages (ETPIR). The ETPIR problem is first studied in [6] , [7] , where an achievable scheme and a converse are provided, although the two do not match. We will close the gap and establish the exact capacity in this work. It turns out that neither the achievable scheme nor the converse in [6] , [7] is tight and we need to improve both. Recent work [8] considers a related PIR setting with eavesdroppers, but the eavesdropping model is different. In [8] , the eavesdropper can wiretap all servers, but can only observe a fraction of each server's answer. While in our work, the eavesdropper can only wiretap E (instead of all N ) servers, but if a server is wiretapped, then its answer is fully (instead of partially) observed by the eavesdropper. We finally consider SPIR. Relative to PIR, SPIR requires one more constraint on data-privacy at the user side. Namely, the user should not learn any information about the other messages besides the desired one. Although this work focuses exclusively on the PIR problem, our result turns out to relate intimately to SPIR so that a brief summary of known results along this line is presented next. For a PIR problem, if the letter 'S' is added to its description, we are referring to the same problem with SPIR constraint. For example, SPIR refers to the PIR problem with data-privacy requirement, and its capacity is shown to be C SPIR = 1 − 1 N [9] . The capacity of TSPIR is characterized as C TSPIR = 1 − T N , by specializing a more general result from [10] . The capacity of TSPIR with Byzantine (active) adversaries is characterized as
, [7] . The capacity of ETSPIR is established to be
in [11] , [7] . An interesting observation from these results is that the capacity of a PIR problem is always the inverse of a sum of a geometric series with K terms, and decreases with the number of messages K while the capacity of an SPIR problem does not depend K. Furthermore, the SPIR capacity is the limit of the corresponding PIR capacity by taking K → ∞.
The main contribution of this work is that we characterize the capacity of ETPIR (where two elements -eavesdropper and colluding servers are added to the conventional setting of PIR). Specifically, K messages are replicated at N servers. A user wants to retrieve one message by communicating with the servers, without revealing the identity of the desired message. Any T servers may collude, that is, they may share their communication with the user to infer the desired message index. The system is vulnerable to eavesdroppers, who are curious about the messages and can tap in on the communication between any E servers and the user. The ETPIR protocol should prevent the eavesdropper from learning any information about the messages. We show that the capacity of ETPIR is
To achieve the capacity, the servers need to share some common randomness that is independent of the messages, in the amount of at least an E N fraction of one over the capacity times the message size. Otherwise, the capacity is zero and the ETPIR problem is not feasible.
The ETPIR capacity result includes the capacity results of various previously studied settings as special cases, e.g., TPIR, PIR, ETSPIR, TSPIR and SPIR. A pictorial illustration is shown in Figure 1 . It is interesting that in the regime of E ≥ T , ETPIR capacity is always equal to ETSPIR capacity (instead of approaching it in the large K limit), i.e., there is no penalty in the retrieval rate by further requiring data-privacy at the user side.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
A database comprised of K messages is replicated at N servers. The messages {W k } are independent and each message consists of L symbols from
Here and throughout the paper we measure entropy to base q.
A user wants to retrieve a message W κ with index κ from the servers, where the desired message index κ follows some prior distribution over [1 : K] . Denote the realization of κ by k. Based on k, the user generates random queries to send to the servers. The query received by Server n is denoted by Q
denote the complete query scheme, namely, the collection of all queries under all choices of the desired message index. The queries are independent of the messages, i.e., I(Q; W [1:K] ) = 0. In the communication system, an eavesdropper is interested in the messages and can tap in on the communication between any E servers and the user. To prevent the eavesdropper from learning the messages, the servers share a common random variable, denoted by S, which is independent of the messages and the queries, i.e., I(S; W [1:K] , Q) = 0. Let ρ denote the ratio of the amount of common randomness relative to the message size, i.e., ρ
The servers follow the protocol agreed with the user a priori, and generate answers based on the received query Q [k] n , the stored messages W [1:K] , and the common random variable S. The answer sent to the user from Server n is denoted by A
The eavesdropper must learn no information about the messages from the queries and answers of any E servers. That is, the following E-security constraint must be satisfied,
Any T servers may collude. To guarantee user-privacy, from the queries and answers of any T servers, together with the message contents and the common random variable, the servers should not be able to infer any information about the desired message index. Thus, the following T -privacy constraint must be satisfied,
From all the answers downloaded from the servers and the available information at the user, the user should be able to decode the desired message with diminishing probability of error as L tends to infinity. By Fano's inequality, this corresponds to the following correctness constraint,
The ETPIR rate, R of a scheme characterizes the number of desired information symbols retrieved per downloaded information symbol,
A rate R is said to be -error achievable if there exists a sequence of ETPIR schemes with rate at least R, and probability of error P e → 0 as L → ∞. The supremum of all -error achievable rates is called the -error capacity C.
III. MAIN RESULT
Theorem 1 below states the main result of this work.
Theorem 1:
The capacity of the ETPIR problem is
To achieve the capacity,
ETPIR , the ETPIR problem is not feasible. The complete proof is deferred to the full paper [12] . In the next section, we show via examples the idea of the achievable scheme when E < T (the main contribution of this work).
IV. ACHIEVABILITY WHEN E < T

A. Elemental case
Let's start with the smallest setting with K = 2 messages, N = 3 servers where any T = 2 may collude, and an eavesdropper who may hear the communication associated with any E = 1 server.
Let {a i } and {b i } denote the mixtures (linear combinations) of symbols from W 1 and W 2 respectively, and let r, s, t denote three uniform independent symbols shared by the servers (unknown to the eavesdropper and the user). It is natural to start with a scheme in the following form where the answer from 1 server is pure noise. Without loss of generality, suppose the user wants to retrieve W 1 .
Server 1
Server 2 Server 3
Although the above scheme is correct as noise variables and non-desired symbols can be cancelled, it is not 2-private as Server 1 and Server 2 can collude and figure out that the b symbols have the same indices while the a symbols have distinct indices. To make it 2-private, we add message symbols with carefully chosen linear coefficients to Server 3 (so that it will enhance privacy and simultaneously act as the noise provider), as shown below. 
Further, a 5 , a 6 , b 5 , b 6 are assigned as follows. 
We are now ready to prove that the scheme satisfies the required properties. Correctness: We call one row of the retrieval table a query row. That is, a query row is comprised of one symbol downloaded from each server. After removing the noise symbols r, s, t, from the first query row (i.e., a 1 +r, a 3 +r, a 1 +a 3 +r), the user decodes a 1 and a 3 . From the second query row, the user obtains b 3 − b 1 and b 4 − b 2 , which are used to cancel the interference caused by W 2 in the third query row. After canceling the interference, the user decodes a 2 and a 4 from the third query row. Because U 1 is full-rank and known by the user, the user can decode the 4 symbols of W 1 from a (1:4) . 1-security: Because r, s, t are uniformly distributed random variables independent of the message symbols, we have
Therefore, from the answer of any server, the eavesdropper can learn nothing about the messages W 1 , W 2 . 2-privacy: Privacy is guaranteed by the observation that the answers of any 2 servers contain 4 linearly independent random combinations of symbols from each message. For example, Server 1 and Server 2 observe a (1:4) and b (1:4) , which are linearly independent random combinations of the 2 messages. Server 1 and Server 3 observe
Therefore, Server 1 and Server 3 also observe linearly independent random combinations of W 1 and W 2 . The case where Server 2 and Server 3 collude follows similarly. Because U 1 , U 2 are independently and uniformly chosen from all 4 × 4 full-rank matrices, the mapping from W 1 to a (1:4) is i.i.d. as the mapping from W 2 to b (1:4) . The invertible relation in (8) indicates that the random variables on both sides of (8) are identically distributed (a more detailed proof of this argument appears in Lemma 1 of [2] ), so that any 2 servers cannot distinguish W 1 and W 2 and the scheme is private. Achievable rate: The scheme downloads 9 symbols in total, out of which the user can decode 4 desired symbols. Therefore, the rate achieved by this scheme is 4/9, which matches the capacity promised in Theorem 1. The achieved common randomness size ρ (1/3 of the total download) is also as promised.
Server n Layer 1:
. . .
Layer 2:
i + X [2] i + S [1, 2] i i∈I(n,2,1)
i + X [3] i + S [1, 3] i i∈I (n,2,2) . . .
X [2] i + X [3] i + S [2, 3] i i∈I (n,2,K) . . . 
B. General parameters K, N, T, E
In this section, we present the structure of the retrieval scheme for general parameters of K, N, T and E when E < T . In our scheme, we force symmetry across the servers, i.e., the structure of the downloaded symbols from all servers is the same. Table I shows the detailed structure for Server n and the structure is explained in detail as follows.
The downloaded symbols from Server n may be divided into K layers. For layer ι ∈ [1 : K], each symbol is a mixture of symbols from ι distinct messages (hence called an ι-sum) and a distinct noise symbol. In particular, X Table II 
and I(n, ι, t) denotes the index set of the ι-sums. All the indices are formulated by
where L n is calculated below and NL n is the total number of mixtures of any message appeared in all N servers. The indices are enumerated from 1 to NL n , and are distributed from Server 1 to Server N , and at each server from layer 1 to layer K. We calculate the rate achieved. The number of symbols downloaded from each server is
Type index
Type of ι-sum Index set Downloaded symbols 
For any message W k , the number of mixtures X 
T − E)
K−ι = (N − E) K−1 . In the full paper [12] , we show that with proper precoding design of the mixtures {X [k] i } and the noise symbols {S [K] i }, the scheme can decode (N − E) · L n = (N − E) K symbols from the desired message. Hence, the scheme achieves the rate R = (N −E)·Ln N ·Dn
K . The details of the precoding design and the justification of security, privacy, and correctness are deferred to the full paper [12] .
V. CONCLUSIONS
We characterize the capacity of ETPIR, which includes many previous works as special cases (refer to Figure 1) , and the present work capitalizes on all ideas used in these works. Further, new challenges arise that go beyond previously studied problems, and new ideas are proposed to resolve the corresponding challenges. In particular, in the achievability proof when E < T (Section IV), we require a layered MDS structure that simultaneously handles 3 correlated constraints -security, privacy and correctness.
Regarding future work, it will be interesting to see whether including other elements would result in similar synergistic interactions, such as coded databases [13] , [14] , nonresponsive servers [2] , active adversaries [5] , [11] , [15] , multiround protocols [16] , arbitrary message length [17] , [18] and secure storage [19] , [20] etc. Another promising direction is to find explicit precoding matrices when E < T as we have only shown the existence in our schemes. In particular, it is interesting to see if Vandermonde matrices are sufficient. Also, our correctness conditions are over-constrained such that relaxations might lead to field size reduction.
